Step 2: Improving the oversight of the intelligence- and security services
The bill
The government proposes to enhance the oversight of the secret services. After the minister decides to have somebody tapped, the oversight committee (CTIVD) can point out that this mandate was unjustified. Subsequently, the minister is legally obliged to 'reconsider' the mandate, whereupon he may decide to ignore the verdict of the CTIVD. Finally, it's up to the "Commissie Stiekem" (which translates roughly as "Sneaky Committee", the Parliamentary Select Committee on Intelligence and Security Services that consists of the chairs of the parliamentary parties) to judge whether the minister was right or wrong in ignoring the verdict of the CTIVD.
We consider it problematic that the final verdict concerning the legality of the minister's decision to have somebody tapped is not made by a judge or an independent oversight committee, but by politicians. That makes it a political decision rather than a judicial one.
Furthermore, the measures that the "Commissie Stiekem" might take resulting from the minister's actions are problematic. Imagine the "Commissie Stiekem" reaches the conclusion that an individual has been tapped unjustly. Would the committee relieve the minister of his duties? As everything here will be classified as 'state secret', the committee members would not be allowed to comment on the events in public. The only information that will be disclosed is that the minister has done something so gravely wrong that he was forced to resign. But the exact details would remain unclear.
Please formulate your response in your own words. You might consider:
I believe it is irresponsible to allow politicians to make the decision regarding whether a specific mandate was justified or not. They are not qualified to pass verdict on such matters.
It would be much better if the verdict of the oversight committee would be binding, or if a judge would pass verdict. Both scenarios would guarantee that the verdict would not be a political one.
